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Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving
∗

Monte Neil Stewart and William C. Duncan
I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2005, a San Francisco trial judge held that California
voters’ recent reaffirmation of marriage as the union of a man and a
woman violated the state constitution’s equality guarantee because
that reaffirmation prevents same-sex couples from marrying.1 In so
holding, the court relied heavily on what is commonly known in
“same-sex marriage” discourse as the argument of the Loving
analogy—an analogy more fairly labeled Perez/Loving. In 1948, the
California Supreme Court in Perez v. Lippold 2 led the way for the
nation by holding that statutory prohibitions of interracial marriages
violated constitutional protections of equality. Then in 1967, the
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia3 held the same.
The argument of the Perez/Loving analogy, in its simplest form,
goes like this: Because it is unconstitutional (as unequal and unfair)
to prevent a black from marrying a white, it is likewise
unconstitutional to prevent a man from marrying a man or a woman
from marrying a woman.
The argument of the Perez/Loving analogy4 is not only
ubiquitous in genderless marriage cases5 but is also ubiquitous in the
∗ This Article is available online at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org. The authors
acknowledge the superb research assistance relative to this Article provided by Glenn Roper,
Anne Hancock, Rob Mooney, and Eric Jenkins. The authors wish especially to thank Mike
Erickson for his superb assistance in readying the Article for publication.
1. In re Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 2005).
2. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Hereafter “the Perez/Loving argument.”
5. Rather than use the more common phrase “same-sex marriage,” this Article uses the
phrase “genderless marriage” to refer to a form of civil marriage defined as the union of any
two persons. The phrase “same-sex marriage” is subtly misleading; although the legal
definition of civil marriage as the union of any two persons would allow same-sex couples to
marry, it, of course, also would allow a woman and a man to marry, and everywhere the debate
focuses on one legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two. The phrase “samesex marriage” thus conveys the sense (erroneously) of a legally recognized marriage separate or
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popular debate on the meaning of civil marriage, no doubt because
the argument is simple—that is, easy to make and easy to grasp—and
thus well suited to a “sound bite” political culture. It also seems fair
to say that the argument is a favorite of those advocating the
redefinition of marriage as the union of any two persons and that it is
likewise a media darling.
A. A Suggestion of Betrayal
Sometimes, but not always, simple arguments are flawed by
superficiality. That is, they work at the surface level, at the level of
the obvious, but are defeated by deeper realites constituting the
subject of the argument. The subject of the Perez/Loving argument
is, of course, marriage. Recent work investigating the realities
constituting marriage6 suggests that the argument is flawed by
superficiality. In a more startling and grave progression, however,
that work also suggests that judicial adoption of the Perez/Loving
argument amounts to a betrayal of those two landmark cases. This
Article assesses the validity of this suggestion of betrayal—a
suggestion summarized in unvarnished fashion in the following
paragraphs.7
Marriage is a vital social institution. As such, it is constituted by a
complex web of shared public meanings, with a core meaning
being—across cultures and time—the union of a man and a woman.
Like other powerful social institutions, marriage performs an
important educative and socializing function. In its sphere, the
marriage institution shapes and guides individuals’ identities,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct, including what they believe to
be important and what they strive to achieve. It is in this way that

different from the marriage of a man and a woman. This Article refers to civil marriage defined
as the union of a man and a woman as “man/woman marriage.” The term “genderless” is used
instead of “nongendered” and “man/woman” instead of “gendered” because, as a matter of
contemporary language usage, use of the words “gendered” and “nongendered” could be seen
as an endorsement of certain versions of social constructionist thought. Although those
versions may be valid, this Article stands neutral on the validity question for reasons made clear
elsewhere. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 85–
95 (2004), available at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/jrm.pdf.
6. E.g., Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE
DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9, 15 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds.,
2004) [hereinafter DIVORCING MARRIAGE]; Stewart, supra note 5, at 75–85.
7. Because this is merely a summary, footnotes are not used. Attribution for the ideas
contained in the summary appears in footnotes in later sections.
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the constitutive meanings of marriage provide valuable social goods,
some uniquely.
The law has a role relative to the marriage institution, as it does
with other social institutions of betterment. In support, the law gives
marriage formal recognition, brings legal and administrative
arrangements into line with institutional practices, facilitates the
institution’s use by members of the community, and encourages the
transmission of institutional values from generation to generation.
But the law can also change or even dismantle an institution—it does
so by changing or suppressing the shared public meanings
constituting the institution.
Because marriage has a powerful educative role in our society—a
power reinforced by the supporting law’s authoritative voice—the
marriage institution is a tempting target for those seeking to advance
the sociopolitical purposes of an ideology unrelated to marriage. If
those so seeking can appropriate the institution and bend it to their
purposes, they have gone far in assuring the triumph of their agenda.
In the American past, two social movements temporarily
succeeded in using marriage as a means to achieve ulterior ends: the
white supremacist movement and the eugenics movement. In fact,
the antimiscegenation laws were often found in the same legislative
package as the laws calling for the sterilization of “idiots” and other
so-called “genetic undesirables.” Central to the white supremacists’
project was the alteration of the core meaning of marriage from the
union of a man and a woman to the union of a man and a woman of
the same “race.” Laws that prohibited blacks from marrying whites
were an ugly feature grafted onto the marriage institution—the very
logic of which makes the graft a foreign object. The voice of those
laws, however, greatly magnified by social institutional power, subtly
but effectively inculcated throughout society the core dogma of
white supremacy. The courts that gave us the Perez and Loving
decisions apprehended the white supremacists’ marriage project for
what it was and rightly used constitutional equality norms to
dismantle it. In the process, those courts restored to marriage the
integrity of its institutional purposes and logic, an historic
accomplishment. It is that accomplishment that is now being
betrayed.
The goal of the gay/lesbian rights movement’s marriage project,
like that of the white supremacists, is to appropriate the institution
and change it to achieve sociopolitical purposes unrelated to
557
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marriage. Again, that change entails an alteration in a core,
constitutive meaning: from the union of a man and a woman to the
union of any two persons. Granted that the respective objectives of
the old and the new marriage projects are very different, still the
projects in their appropriative strategy are of a kind.
Thus, because Perez and Loving refused to allow the marriage
institution to be appropriated for nonmarriage ends, to use those
two cases to advance just such an appropriative project is to betray
them. In other words, the Perez/Loving argument advances a
superficial analogy that masks a deep disanalogy. That disanalogy is
between the intention of Perez and Loving to protect marriage from
appropriation for nonmarriage purposes and the intention of the
present marriage project to make such an appropriation. Thus, those
who deploy the Perez/Loving argument, whether advocates or
judges, are misleading people, including perhaps themselves.
Nor is this betrayal cured by an appeal to Perez’s and Loving’s
vindication of constitutional equality norms—that is, by the
argument that whereas the white supremacist marriage project
fostered inequality by the exclusiveness of the antimiscegenation laws,
the new marriage project fosters equality by the inclusiveness of its
different redefinition of marriage. This, of course, is an argument
that the ends justify the means, but the argument steadfastly ignores
certain realities regarding those means. One such reality is that an
institution constituted by the core meaning of “the union of any two
persons” is not a modification of the marriage institution but a
radically different alternative to it. Another reality is that, backed by
the force of constitutional law, the new institution will, in not many
years, displace and, in that fashion, destroy (deinstitutionalize) the
old institution. For it is clear that society cannot, at one and the
same time, tell the people (and especially the children) that marriage,
in its core meaning, is the union of any two persons and that
marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of a man and a woman.
Finally, when the marriage institution goes, its array of valuable
social goods, many unique, goes also.
An “equality” enshrined at such a cost to human development
and social welfare is not the equality vindicated by Perez and Loving
or otherwise intended by our constitutional norms.
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B. The Structure of the Article

The foregoing is the unvarnished suggestion that we mean to
address in some detail to see how it holds up. Before giving the
roadmap to that endeavor, however, we need to say a word about a
volatile subject: discussion of the gay/lesbian rights movement in a
context that also encompasses the white supremacist movement. We
ask that the reader in good faith (the only one we are writing for)
not jump to the conclusion that we are equating Bill Eskridge with
Bull Connor or the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
with the Klu Klux Klan; if she does so, we are not apt to be given a
thoughtful read. What we are doing is considering whether those
two movements have employed an essentially similar strategy relative
to marriage. If so, that is something worth knowing, and knowing it
may lead to other things worth knowing. That those two movements
have profoundly different objectives goes without saying. Whether
that difference justifies the present use of the older movement’s
strategy (if that is so) also seems to us worth some thoughtful
analysis. So with apologies to any who may take offense at our choice
to investigate these matters, we will go forward.
In Part II, we set forth the understandings and implications of
marriage as a social institution. In Part III, we review both the white
supremacist marriage project that resulted in the antimiscegenation
laws and the work of the Perez and Loving courts in dismantling that
project. In Part IV, we trace the use of the Perez/Loving argument
over the past three decades—the period in which advocates have
sought to redefine marriage as the union of any two persons.
Because use of the argument has been ubiquitous, this exercise
provides a good overview of the genderless marriage issue in the
courts. Part V goes to the heart of the matter. It considers the
evidence that the gay/lesbian rights movement, following a strategy
analogous to the white supremacist movement, is trying to
appropriate marriage by changing its core meaning contrary to the
institution’s purposes and logic, for the purpose of advancing a
social, cultural, and political agenda essentially unrelated to
marriage.8 Part VI concludes with reflections on likely consequences
if the new marriage project succeeds.
8. These comments on terminology seem merited: When we speak of marriage’s
“institutional purposes and logic” or words to that effect, we are referring not to the entire
complex of purposes and values inhering in the social institution of marriage as now
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II. MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION
Marriage is a social institution.9 As such, it shares with all other
social institutions certain salient features. Or stated slightly
differently, what can be said accurately about all social institutions
can be said accurately of the institution of marriage. One of the most
important understandings is this: social institutions are constituted in
large measure by shared public meanings. Although in pedestrian use
the word “institution” may conjure up an image of an edifice
constructed of steel, concrete, and glass, a social institution is not so
constituted. Rather, it is “constituted by complex webs of social
meaning.”10 John Searle explains this social reality using the example
of another social institution, money:
[W]e can say, for example, in order that the concept ‘money’ apply
to the stuff in my pocket, it has to be the sort of thing that people
think is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it ceases to
function as money, and eventually ceases to be money. . . . [I]n
order that a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in order that
it should fall under the concept of money, it must be believed to
be, or used as, or regarded as, etc., satisfying the definition. . . .
And what goes for money goes for elections, private property, wars,

experienced in American society; rather, we are referring to those components of that complex
that three decades of court cases show to be most relevant to the genderless marriage issue.
These components include the private welfare purpose discussed previously by Stewart, supra
note 5, at 44–46, and summarized in these words: “Hence, what is understood to be a
fundamental and originating purpose of marriage: to confine procreative passion to a setting, a
social institution actually, that will assure, to the largest practical extent, that passion’s
consequences (children) begin and continue life with adequate private welfare.” Id. at 45. Still
focusing on children, another purpose is to make real the child’s right to know and to be
brought up by his or her biological parents (with exceptions being justified only in the best
interests of the child, not those of any adult). Another purpose is to bridge the male-female
divide. Yet another is to confer the status of husband and wife and to transform identity and
conduct in a way consistent with that status. For more on these purposes, see infra Part VI.
When we speak of the use of the marriage institution for “nonmarriage” purposes or words to
that effect, we mean purposes not logically consistent with the purposes just identified or
actually inimical to them. This terminology is used not to pass moral or normative judgment
on the nonmarriage purposes but to describe what seems to be a feature of those purposes
important in the context of the Perez/Loving argument.
9. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“[T]he marriage
relation [is] an institution more basic in our civilization than any other.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (“Marriage is a vital social institution.”).
10. Stewart, supra note 5, at 83.

560

1STEWART.FIN

555]

8/26/2005 12:01 PM

Betrayal of Perez and Loving

voting, promises, marriages, buying and selling, political offices,
and so on.11

The shared meanings that constitute a social institution interact
and are interdependent; each meaning affects and is dependent on all
the others. “An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and
informal—governing social relationships.”12
Social institutions shape and guide individuals’ identities,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct. An institution “supplies to the
people who participate in it what they should aim for, dictates what
is acceptable or effective for them to do, and teaches how they must
relate to other members of the institution and to those on the
outside.”13 This profound influence ought not to be underestimated;
institutions “shape[] what those who participate in [them] think of
themselves and of one another, what they believe to be important,
and what they strive to achieve.”14 Thus,
an institution guides and sustains individual identity in the same
way as a family, forming individuals by enabling or disabling certain
ways of behaving and relating to others, so that each individual’s
possibilities depend on the opportunities opened up within the
institution to which the person belongs.15

But inasmuch as human societies create and sustain social
institutions, a society can change its social institutions. “Institutions
can be changed in the sense that they will necessarily change if
sufficiently many individuals try to change them.”16 And because
social institutions are constituted by shared public meanings, they are
necessarily changed when those meanings are changed and/or no
longer sufficiently shared. Indeed, that is the only way a social
institution can be changed.
An individual may withdraw his deposit from a bank, or break the
law, or the rules [of] a game, without causing the change or
11. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 32 (1995) (emphasis
added).
12. Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and
Social Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 19 (Mary C. Brinton &
Victor Nee eds., 1998).
13. Stewart, supra note 5, at 111.
14. Id.
15. HELEN REECE, DIVORCING RESPONSIBLY 185 (2003).
16. EERIK LAGERSPETZ, THE OPPOSITE MIRRORS: AN ESSAY ON THE
CONVENTIONALIST THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 28 (1995).
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collapse of the institutions concerned. Such an action would not be
possible for all individuals acting as a collective [without causing
that change or collapse]. Conversely, there are acts which are
possible only for all individuals, but not for any single individual.
Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying institutions are
examples of this.17

Just as social institutions can be changed by alteration of the
constitutive shared public meanings, so they can be renewed and
strengthened by use consistent with those shared public meanings.
[A]s several social theorists have pointed out, institutions are not
worn out by continued use, but each use of the institution is in a
sense a renewal of that institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we
use them but constant use renews and strengthens institutions such
as marriage, property, and universities. . . . [I]n terms of the
continued collective intentionality of the users, each use of the
institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users
to the institution.18

And just as social institutions can be changed or reinforced,
social institutions can be entirely dismantled.
The secret of understanding the continued existence of institutional
facts is simply that the individuals directly involved and a sufficient
number of members of the relevant community must continue to
recognize and accept the existence of such facts. . . . The moment,
for example, that all or most of the members of a society refuse to
acknowledge [the social institution of] property rights, as in a
revolution or other upheaval, property rights cease to exist in that
society. 19

Society can use the law effectively to reinforce, to alter, or to
dismantle a social institution. This is because the law has an
expressive or educative function that is magnified by its authoritative
voice.20 And in actual practice, the law’s authoritative voice is used to

17. Eerik Lagerspetz, On the Existence of Institution, in ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL
Lagerspetz et al. eds., 2001).
18. SEARLE, supra note 11, at 57 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 117.
20. E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986) (“Supporting valuable
forms of life is a social rather than an individual matter. Monogamy, assuming that it is the
only morally valuable form of marriage, cannot be practised by an individual. It requires a
culture which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public’s attitude and through

AND INSTITUTIONAL REALITY 70, 82 (Eerik
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reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the shared public meanings that
constitute a social institution. Regarding the reinforcing function,
Joseph Raz observes:
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social
institutions which enjoy unanimous support in the community, in
order to give them formal recognition, bring legal and
administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use
by members of the community who wish to do so, and encourage
the transmission of belief in their value to future generations. In
many countries this is the significance of the legal recognition of
monogamous marriage and prohibition of polygamy.21

Use of the law to reinforce or alter or extinguish the shared
public meanings that constitute a social institution is a political act.
As Edward Schiappa notes, “Definitions put into practice a special
sort of social knowledge—a shared understanding among people
about themselves, the objects of their world, and how they ought to
use language.”22 He continues:
If we look hard enough, all definitions serve some sort of interests
. . . . Defining what is or is not part of our shared reality is a
profoundly political act. The establishment of authoritative
definitions by law or custom requires a political process involving
persuasion or force that generates political results by advancing
some views and interests and not others.23

To alter a social institution by altering the shared public
meanings that constitute it (whether by use of the law or otherwise)
is to alter—if not immediately then certainly soon—the individual
identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct formed by reference
to the old institution. The greater the alteration to the institution,
the greater the changes in the individual. Likewise, the more
influential the social institution being changed, the greater the
changes in the individual.24

its formal institutions.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 69–71 (1996).
21. RAZ, supra note 20, at 161.
22. EDWARD SCHIAPPA, DEFINING REALITY: DEFINITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 3 (2003).
23. Id. at 69–70 (citation omitted).
24. E.g., RAZ, supra note 20, at 392.
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Almost universally, a shared, public, and core meaning
(constituting the social institution of marriage) is that marriage is the
union of a man and a woman.25 That meaning has been a
constitutive core of the institution in the American experience. That
core meaning has been and continues to be influential in forming
individual identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct in a way
and to an extent that common sense readily comprehends.
[M]arriage is an institution that interacts with a unique socialsexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide. It
negotiates a stable partnership of life and property. It seeks to
manage the procreative process and to establish parental obligations
to offspring. It supports the birthright of children to be connected
to their mothers and fathers.

....
Michael Foucault contends that marriage has fostered a
particular type of human identity, namely, the “conjugal self.” Be
that as it may, marriage has always been the central cultural site of
male-female relations. A rich history and a complex heritage of
symbols, myths, theologies, traditions, poetry, and art have been
generated by the institution of marriage, which encodes a unique
set of aspirations into human culture along the axis of permanent
opposite-sex bonding and parent-child connectedness.26

Man/woman marriage is deemed to provide well, and even
uniquely, a number of social goods besides those just identified. It is
the only institution that can confer the status of husband and wife;27
in particular, it is the only effective means to socialize and acculturate
and thereby transform males into husbands—a process the institution
sustains both before and after the wedding.28 The institution
performs the same transformative role in the creation of

25. As put by Justice Blair in the Ontario Divisional Court decision in Halpern v.
Toronto, 60 O.R.3d 321 (Ont. Div. Ct. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 O.R.3d 161
(Ont. 2003), “Anthropological, sociological and historical studies reveal that from time
immemorial ‘marriage’ has almost universally been viewed as a monogamous union between a
man and a woman.” Id. at para. 40. For more on the appellate decision in the Halpern case,
see infra note 145 and text accompanying notes 167 and 171.
26. Cere, supra note 6, at 11, 14 (footnote omitted).
27. See F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society,
and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2003).
28. See Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in
DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 41, 47–48.
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husband/fathers, another identity beneficially different than that of a
mere male.29 It also promotes (by privileging) that form of adult
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may
rationally value above all other such forms.30
A social institution defined at its core as the union of any two
persons is unmistakably different from the historic marriage
institution.31
Much has been and can be said about public meanings
influencing, [or] constituting, social institutions, which in turn
influence, even define, the human participants. All of that can be
said, of course, about both man/woman marriage as an institution
and genderless marriage as an institution. The point is the high
likelihood that an institution defined at its core as the union of a
man and a woman (with all that limitation implies and entails
regarding purposes and activities) will intend and sustain “the social
understandings, the practices, the goods, and the social selves” in
large measure not intended or sustained by an institution defined at
its core as any two persons in a close personal relationship.32

The difference in constitutive meanings of necessity means that
what the new institution teaches relative to individual identity,
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct is substantially different from
the formative instruction of the current institution of man/woman
marriage. That does not mean, of course, that there is no overlap in
formative instruction; the significance is in the divergence. One
important divergence centers on the normativeness of married
heterosexual relations and the normative exceptionality of all other
forms of intimate human conduct. Another centers on the relative
pre-eminence or subordination of the interests and desires of adults,

29. See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 139–88 (1996).
30. Stewart, supra note 5, at 52–57.
31. Observers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed regarding the
realities of social institutions uniformly acknowledge the magnitude of these differences
between the two possible institutions of marriage. This is so regardless of the observers’ own
sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or preference. See, e.g., LADELLE MCWHORTER,
BODIES AND PLEASURES: FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 125
(1999); RAZ, supra note 20, at 393; Cere, supra note 6, at 11–18; Douglas Farrow, Canada’s
Romantic Mistake, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 1, 1–5; Young & Nathanson,
supra note 28, at 48–56.
32. Stewart, supra note 5, at 77 (footnote omitted).
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on one hand, and of the interests and needs of children, on the other
hand.33
Redefinition has other practical outcomes. For our purposes,
perhaps the most important is found at the intersection of the law’s
authoritative role (relative to marriage’s meanings) and the unitary
nature of the institution. By unitary nature, we mean simply that
society can sustain one and only one marriage institution. Society
cannot, at one and the same time, tell the people (and especially the
children) that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of any two
persons and that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of a man
and a woman. Given the role of language and meaning in
constituting and sustaining institutions, two “coexisting” social
institutions known society-wide as marriage would seem to amount
to a factual impossibility. When we speak of law’s authoritative role
relative to marriage’s meaning, we are thinking of this: Once the law
(on constitutional grounds no less) has taken a stand that the core
meaning is the union of any two persons, the law will then be
unrelenting and thoroughgoing in enforcement of that decision. The
law’s own internal logic and institutional mandates require no less.
Thus, at the intersection of the unitary nature of marriage and the
law’s authoritative role in marriage’s meaning, what will result is the
new meaning being mandated in texts, in schools, and in virtually
every other part of the public square, and also being voluntarily
published by the media and other institutions.34 Even linguistic,
social, or religious enclaves dedicated to preserving the old meaning
will have a difficult time.35

33. See Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE,
supra note 6, at 66–67, 78; Seana Sugrue, Marriage: Inside and Out 14–15 (paper presented at
Illuminating Marriage Conference, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, May 18–20, 2005, on file
with author)(“Hence, same-sex marriage as well as a number of other marital reforms, . . .
foster the vulnerability of children to advance the desires of adults.”).
34. Id. at 111.
35. Helen Reece explains:
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who
are dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial
norm community. But this is not a complete solution because the social
construction of choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem
unthinkable or may be too costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it
may also be merely reactive to or even defined by the dominant norm community.
REECE, supra note 15, at 38.
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This repetition seems merited. These realities regarding social
institutions in general and the social institution of marriage in
particular are not controversial in the literature on the nature of
institutions. Although each side’s “spin” and emphasis in the current
genderless marriage debate differ dramatically, no scholarship (to
date, anyway) has attempted to refute the social realities summarized
above. And, as we show next, it seems clear that the leaders of the
white supremacist movement apprehended these social realities and
built a cunning strategy based on that understanding.
III. THE ASCENDANCY AND THE DISMANTLING OF THE WHITE
SUPREMACISTS’ MARRIAGE PROJECT
A. The Ascendancy
The history of antimiscegenation laws in the United States shows
their purpose to be the promotion of white supremacy. “Under the
common law of England, difference in race was not a disability
rendering parties incapable of contracting marriage.”36 Although in
some areas of the United States antimiscegenation laws date back to
colonial times,37 a number of Southern states had no
antimiscegenation statutes before the Civil War.38 One commentator
noted that “[d]uring Reconstruction, anti-miscegenation laws, which
had assumed a relatively minor position in Southern slave codes,
spread to a number of Southern states for the first time.”39 Despite
being of comparatively late origin, these laws took a deep hold in the
South, and whereas “many states repealed their anti-miscegenation
laws after ratification of the Civil War amendments, most Southern
states did not.”40 Even in those states declining repeal, a very few
early cases accepted the claim that the 1866 Civil Rights Act

36. Robert Kovach, Note, Miscegenation Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 89 (1949).
37. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia,
1860s–1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 389 (1994).
38. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1297, 1345 n.172 (1998); Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 372.
39. Hasday, supra note 38, at 1345.
40. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1993) (citing ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND
THE LAW 64 (1972)).

567

1STEWART.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/26/2005 12:01 PM

[2005

invalidated antimiscegenation laws.41 But as late as 1910, twentyeight states still had antimiscegenation laws in effect; sixteen such
laws were still in effect at the time of the decision in Loving in
1967.42
Although on their face the statutes only redefined marriage laws,
numerous sources support the idea that the true aim of these statutes
was to promote the white supremacist agenda. One commentator
has pointed out that “it is clear that the prohibitions on racial
intermarriage were indeed intended to be, among other things,
‘badges and incidents of slavery.’”43 She also argues that “Southern
antimiscegenation laws trumpeted the message that White families
should close ranks to exclude and thus socially subordinate inferior
Blacks.”44 Another author has said that “[w]hite supremacists viewed
interracial marriage as an abomination possibly resulting in the
annihilation of the white race along with all of its concomitant glory.
Legal restrictions on miscegenation were therefore necessary to
prevent this perceived debacle.”45 A 1912 treatise on Georgia
constitutional law described antimiscegenation laws as “erect[ing] a
barrier behind which legitimate home life should be sheltered from
African admixture.”46 A 1931 treatise says that “racial prejudice,
social or ethnological considerations, or the dogma of white
superiority, have resulted in the prohibition of inter-racial
marriages.”47 And in the Dred Scott decision, “Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney had stressed state laws banning marriage between blacks and
whites to support the conclusion that blacks were not citizens.”48

41. Hasday, supra note 38, at 1365–66; Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific
Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 600
(2000).
42. Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: Population
Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian Americans, 1910–1950, 9
ASIAN L.J. 1, 5, 14 (2002); Trosino, supra note 40, at 98.
43. Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between Us”: Antimiscegenation,
the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.KENT L. REV. 873, 926 (1995).
44. Id. at 908.
45. Trosino, supra note 40, at 100.
46. Van Tassel, supra note 43, at 905 (quoting WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 145 (1912)).
47. CHESTER G. VERNIER, 1 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 204 (1931).
48. Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 379 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 408 (1857)).
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Moreover, by the early twentieth century, antimiscegenation laws
were largely confined to the Western and Southern states.
Commenting on this fact, the 1931 treatise said:
The peculiarly geographic distribution of statutes prohibiting
racial intermarriage forces one to conclude (all logical justification
to the contrary, notwithstanding) that such legislation is not based
primarily upon physiological, psychological, or other scientific
bases, but is for the most part the product of local prejudice and of
local effort to protect the social and economic standards of the
white race.49

A historical analysis also shows that fears of interracial marriage
were used to fuel opposition to Reconstruction Era civil rights laws.50
In fact, antimiscegenation laws were part of a “triad”—together with
restrictions on public accommodations and social equality—which
became “a rallying cry for the force of ‘white supremacy.’”51
The racial fixation of these laws is further illustrated by their ties
to eugenic theories.52 Professor Keith Sealing notes that “[t]he
marriage of scientific racism and the former slaveholders’ need for
anti-miscegenation laws created long-lived progeny.”53 Professor
Jennifer Wriggins similarly says that these laws “were also aimed at
keeping the ‘blood’ of the white race pure and uncontaminated by
‘black blood,’ which was thought to transmit inferior intellect and
other inferior traits.”54 “While many [Jim Crow] statutes dictated
separation broadly between the ‘white and colored races,’ the
drafters of anti-miscegenation laws took much greater pains to
specify the particular racial groups to whom those restrictions
applied.”55 In fact, over time, antimiscegenation laws were changed
to increase the racial restrictions, moving them toward a “one-drop”
rule.56 For instance, in 1927 Alabama changed its antimiscegenation
law to make “the definition of a white person . . . more exclusive

49. VERNIER, supra note 47, at 204–05.
50. Van Tassel, supra note 43, at 906.
51. Id. at 899.
52. Karthikeyan & Chin, supra note 42, at 21–23.
53. Sealing, supra note 41, at 606.
54. Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in
Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1997).
55. Karthikeyan & Chin, supra note 42, at 6.
56. Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 395, 406.
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than ever before”57 by defining a “negro” as a person who has
“negro ancestors, without reference to or limit of time or number of
generations removed.”58 Prosecutions based on antimiscegenation
laws often hinged on racial identity.59
In summary, the antimiscegenation laws were a consequence of
racial dogma and not of the purposes and logic of marriage as
understood for many centuries before.60 In David Wagner’s phrasing,
the antimiscegenation laws must be seen as a logical extension of
racial law, not of marriage law.61
B. The Dismantling of the Genderless Marriage Agenda
Language in the Perez and Loving decisions points to a judicial
understanding that, with these kinds of laws, white supremacists had
appropriated the law of marriage to promote their ideological
program. In each case, the court looked beyond the nominal
regulation of marriage and exposed the white supremacist ideology
that enactment of the laws sought to advance.
1. Perez v. Lippold
In Perez v. Lippold,62 a county clerk refused to issue a marriage
license because of the applicants’ answers to a form question about
their race. The clerk relied on a statute that prohibited not any
interracial marriage, but only marriages between white persons and
those of other races.63 The standard used by the California Supreme
Court in reviewing the law was clear: “There can be no prohibition
of marriage except for an important social objective and by
reasonable means.”64 As the court further articulated, “[l]egislation
infringing [marriage] rights must be based upon more than prejudice

57. Id. at 407.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of Sept. 6, 1927, No. 626, § 5,
1927 Ala. Acts 716, 717).
59. Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial
Marriage: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia, 1860s–1960s, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557, 561–62 (1999).
60. As to those “purposes and logic,” see supra note 8.
61. David Wagner, Why Goodridge Isn’t Loving, Address at the Conference on State
Marriage Amendments at Georgia State University (Apr. 16, 2005).
62. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 19.
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and must be free from oppressive discrimination” to be
constitutional.65 For the court, the relevant question was “whether
the state can restrict that right on the basis of race alone.”66 The
court concluded that the state could not.67
In its opinion, the court outlined the relevant standard for the
regulation of marriage, holding that the state could regulate
marriage for health reasons but that any such regulation “must apply
to all persons regardless of race.”68 The court found that the
California regulations prohibiting a white person from marrying a
person of another race did not do so and that, “[b]y restricting the
individuals’s [sic] right to marry on the basis of race alone, they”
violated the Equal Protection Clause.69 Noting that “[r]ace
restrictions must be viewed with great suspicion,” the court further
held that “[a]ny state legislation discriminating against persons on
the basis of race or color has to overcome the strong presumption
[against such discrimination] inherent in this constitutional policy.”70
In striking down the laws at issue, the court relied in part on its
finding of racial animus behind the laws. It noted that the
antimiscegenation statutes had been enacted along with other racial
classifications71 and that the case law upholding such statutes
contained a number of prejudicial statements about nonwhite races.72
Further noting that the law applied only to interracial marriages
involving whites, the court suggested that the law was “based upon
the theory that the progeny of a white person and a Mongolian or
Negro or Malay are inferior or undesirable, while the progeny of
other different races are not.”73 The court also made much of the
statute’s failure to address mixed-race individuals and of the
difficulties with legislative definitions of race, given the purported
intent of the laws as preventing problems with the offspring of
interracial marriages.74 In its conclusion, the court stated that the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 28.
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challenged laws “violate the equal protection of the laws clause of
the United States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals
to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and unreasonably
discriminating against certain racial groups.”75
Justice
Carter’s
concurrence
also
noted
that
the
antimiscegenation laws were “the product of ignorance, prejudice
and intolerance.”76 To Justice Carter, the relevant constitutional
value was “that all human beings have equal rights regardless of race,
color or creed, and that the right to liberty and the pursuit of
happiness is inalienable and may not be infringed because of race,
color or creed.”77 He believed that “the matter of race equality
should be a settled issue” and “that it is not possible for the
Legislature, in the face of our fundamental law, to enact a valid
statute which proscribes conduct on a purely racial basis.”78 Justice
Carter noted that marriage involves the “pursuit of happiness in its
clearest and most universally approved form.”79 A corollary to this
principle is that “an infringement of that right by means of a racial
restriction is an unlawful infringement of one’s liberty.”80
After the Perez decision was handed down, the commentators
lauded the decision’s emphasis on the invalidating racial nature of
the classification. For instance, one commentator placed the Perez
decision in the context of then-recent court trends: “The past two
years have witnessed significant developments by the courts in
checking discrimination against minority racial groups.”81 Many
other commentators made similar observations.82

75. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
76. Id. (Carter, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 31.
81. Robert T. Hurwitz, Recent Case, 37 CAL. L. REV. 122, 122 (1949).
82. Donald D. Davis, Recent Case, 47 MICH. L. REV. 834 (1949); Francis J. Keating,
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), 24 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 410 (1949); Kovach,
supra note 36; Arturo G. Ortega, Recent Case, 37 GEO. L.J. 442 (1949); Alice Helen Sofis,
Note, The Constitution and Anti-Miscegenation Statutes, 10 PITT. L. REV. 364 (1948);
Theodore C. Sorenson, Recent Case, 28 NEB. L. REV. 475 (1949); William F. Whetmore, Jr.,
Recent Case, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (1948); Case Note, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 303 (1949);
Recent Case, 33 MINN. L. REV. 530 (1948–49); Note, Constitutionality of State AntiMiscegenation Statutes, 43 NW. U. L. REV. 866 (1949); Recent Case, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 438
(1949); Recent Case, 2 VAND. L. REV. 307 (1949).
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2. Loving v. Virginia
Virginia contained similar invalid racial classifications in its
marriage laws. Professor Walter Wadlington noted this about the
Virginia laws just prior to their review by the United States Supreme
83
Court in Loving v. Virginia: “It may seem surprising that a state
which regularly recalls with glowing sentiment the story of how one
of her early white sons married an Indian princess today maintains
one of the strictest legal codes against racial intermarriage.”84 This
strict code was not the product of incidental marriage regulation;
rather, as the Loving court eventually held, it was based in racial
animosity.85
The Loving case began when two Virginians, a Negro woman
and a white man, were married in the District of Columbia.86 When
they returned to Virginia, they were indicted under Virginia’s
miscegenation ban; subsequently, they pled guilty and were later
sentenced to one year in jail, to be suspended on the condition that
they leave the state for twenty-five years.87 The couple returned to
the District of Columbia, from whence they instituted a class action
in Virginia state court seeking to declare the Virginia statute
unconstitutional.88 The case progressed to the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, which upheld the statute’s constitutionality.89
In its decision reversing the Virginia court, the United States
Supreme Court framed the question for review as “whether a
statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent
marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”90 In evaluating this question, the Court
determined that the antimiscegenation statute was an effort to

83. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
84. Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1966) (footnote omitted). The reference is,
of course, to John Smith and Pocahontas.
85. Professor Harvey Applebaum noted that “miscegenation” was “at the heart of racial
prejudice.” Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social
Problem, 53 GEO. L. REV. 49, 78–79 (1964).
86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
87. Id. at 2–3.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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promote an ideology of the superiority of the white race.91 The
opinion initially noted a comment by the judge at the couple’s
criminal trial:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.92

The Court noted the historical root of antimiscegenation laws
“as an incident to slavery” and pointed out that Virginia’s ban was
part of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924 enacted during a period of
“extreme nativism.”93 This act included a requirement of “certificates
of ‘racial composition’ to be kept by both local and state
registrars.”94 The Supreme Court found it significant that an earlier
Virginia Supreme Court decision had identified the following
“legitimate purposes” of the antimiscegenation law: “‘to preserve the
racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of
blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial
pride,’” all of which the United States Supreme Court identified as
“obviously an endorsement of White Supremacy.”95
The Court further identified the “clear and central purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment” as “eliminat[ing] all official state
sources of invidious racial discrimination.”96 The Court concluded
that the challenged law rested “solely upon distinctions drawn
according to race” and that there was “patently no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination
which justifies this classification.”97 The Court stated succinctly:
“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely

91. Id. at 11.
92. Id. at 3. Not insignificantly, the trial court judge did not say that marriage itself was
created to keep the races from mixing, but rather that the state had created antimiscegenation
laws to effect what the judge believed was the intent of God—keeping the races separate.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 10.
97. Id. at 11.
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because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause.”98
After Loving, Reverend Robert S. Drinan, then-Dean of the
Boston College of Law, noted that “[i]n view of the undeniable
racist motivation of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law the Supreme
Court did not really have to confront the question of limits of the
state’s power to regulate the freedom of choosing one’s spouse.”99
Another contemporaneous article said that the decision
“represent[ed] an inevitable conclusion, rather than a major
breakthrough of the Negroes’ quest for equal rights.”100
The important point is this: The historical context, the scholarly
commentary, and the court decisions in Perez and Loving uniformly
sustain the view that, with the antimiscegenation laws, the advocates
of those laws were appropriating the marriage institution to further
an ideology about something else—in this case, race. Acting on an
accurate assessment of the institution of marriage as a powerful
means to advance a social and political agenda essentially
nonmarriage in its purposes, white supremacists used the law to
change and then to highlight shared public meanings constituting
the institution, all in an effort to implement their vision of the
“good” society. With the Perez and Loving decisions, the law ceased
to sustain that marriage project and affirmatively repudiated it.
IV. THE USE OF THE PEREZ/LOVING ARGUMENT:
THREE DECADES IN THE COURTS
This issue—whether society may, consistent with constitutional
guarantees of equality, sustain marriage as the union of a man and a
woman—has been before American courts for more than thirty
years.101 The constitutional challenges became a matter of
considerable public interest for the first time with the 1993 Hawaii

98. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The Court added an alternative basis for its holding,
one sounding in substantive due process: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id.
This alternative basis for the holding has been the launch pad for many circular arguments—
each beginning with an assertion of what marriage “is” as understood by the Court.
99. Robert S. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom To Marry 29 OHIO ST. L.J.
358, 358–59 (1968).
100. Donald W. Merritt, Recent Case, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 512 (1967).
101. See William C. Duncan, The Litigation To Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social
Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004).
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Supreme Court decision applying strict scrutiny analysis to the state’s
marriage law.102 Public interest in the issue has intensified since
November 2003, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
redefined marriage in the commonwealth as the union of any two
persons.103 These cases, as well as all others over the years, have a
common thread: they all cite Loving and/or Perez in some fashion or
other relative to the same-sex couples’ challenge to man/woman
marriage. But the courts have not agreed on the validity of the
Perez/Loving argument or the lessons those cases have for the
contemporary marriage issue.
Just six years after Loving, the Minnesota case Baker v. Nelson104
was the first reported case to weigh the constitutionality of a state
marriage definition. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Loving
did not support a same-sex couples’ claim to redefine marriage
because that case was decided on the basis of Virginia’s
unconstitutional racial classification.105 The court further noted that
the racial classifications in antimiscegenation statutes were
fundamentally different than the sex classification in the marriage law
being challenged in the case before it.106 The U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed the subsequent appeal for failure to state a substantial
federal question—a ruling on the merits.107
Not long after Baker, a Washington court of appeals similarly
rejected the Perez/Loving argument.108 That court also held that
Loving primarily involved the impermissibility of racial
classifications.109 It further noted that while the Loving and Perez
cases involved attempts by interracial couples to marry, the claim for
same-sex marriage was really an attempt to change the “nature of
marriage itself.”110
In the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision Baehr v. Lewin,111
the plurality opinion discussed Loving at some length and asserted
102. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
103. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
104. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972).
105. Id. at 187.
106. Id. (“[T]here is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon
race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”).
107. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
108. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
109. Id. at 1192 n.8.
110. Id. at 1191–92, 1995–96.
111. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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that the reasoning of Loving foreclosed the State’s argument that
marriage is an inherently opposite-sex institution.112 Later in its
opinion, the plurality cited Loving to rebut the State’s argument that
the equal application of the marriage law to both men and women
(neither can marry a person of their same gender) prevents a finding
of sex discrimination.113 Specifically, the plurality said that this
argument is akin to the argument that equal application of
antimiscegenation law to individuals of different races rebuts a
finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination.114 Ignoring a simple
difference between the two contexts—antimiscegenation laws clearly
intended to stamp nonwhites as inferior, while the limitation of
man/woman marriage stamps neither sex as inferior or superior but
treats both as equally necessary—the plurality used Loving’s rejection
of “the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute
containing racial classifications is enough”115 as adequate basis for its
holding of sex discrimination.
In the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision Baker v. Vermont,116
holding that the state’s constitution mandated the benefits of
marriage for same-sex couples, a concurring and dissenting opinion
by Justice Johnson argued that Vermont’s marriage statute is sex
discrimination and, like the Hawaii plurality, cited Loving to establish
that the equal application of the law is not relevant.117 The majority,
112. Id. at 61–63; see also David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998). Because the Loving
decision did not address whether same-sex couples may marry, the plurality opinion needed a
logical or factual link between Loving’s reasoning in its race-based context and the plurality’s
conclusion in its sexual-orientation-based context, but the opinion provided no such link.
Rather, the plurality opinion resorted to a rather supercilious tactic; it asserted (without
support) that the State’s argument was analogous to the argument of the Virginia courts in
Loving that “Deity had deemed” interracial marriages “intrinsically unnatural.” Baehr, 852
P.2d at 63. The plurality then said: “With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone
era, we do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine
Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that
customs change with an evolving social order.” Id. Inasmuch as the State had not asserted that
the marriage law was constitutional because of divine will or commandment and had not
advanced a natural law argument, it is hard to escape the thought that the plurality invoked
Loving for no defensible purpose other than to discredit the State’s argument by a judicially
forced association.
113. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67–68.
114. Id. The validity and relevance of this comparison will be discussed infra Part IV.
115. Id. at 68 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967)).
116. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
117. Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). Stewart has previously criticized
in some detail the Johnson opinion. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 85–95.
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however, specifically disavowed this argument, stating that Justice
Johnson’s opinion’s “reliance [on Loving] is misplaced.”118 Unlike
the court in Loving, the Vermont majority found no intent to
discriminate in the marriage law at issue.119 In fact, the majority held
that “[p]laintiffs have not demonstrated that the exclusion of samesex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to
discriminate against women or lesbians and gay men, as racial
segregation was designed to maintain the pernicious doctrine of
white supremacy.”120
A decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Loving
implicitly relied on the opposite-sex nature of marriage in holding
that marriage was a fundamental right.121 The court reasoned that,
because mandating genderless marriage would go much further than
the Loving decision had gone, Loving did not compel the result that
the plaintiffs sought.122 The court also cited Loving for the
proposition that marriage is subject to appropriate state regulation
and then concluded that the Arizona marriage statute involves such
appropriate regulation because it advances the state interest in
linking procreation and child rearing.123
In the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,124 mandating genderless
marriage, the plurality opinion invoked Loving and Perez for the
proposition that a right to marry means the right to choose whom
one will marry.125 This opinion also analogized the antimiscegenation
laws to man/woman marriage with the assertion that in both
contexts marriage was denied “because of a single trait: skin color in
118. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 887.
121. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 461–62.
124. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
125. Id. at 958. The plurality opinion ignored the reality that the plaintiffs’ (same-sex
couples) “right to marry” of necessity consisted in this context of two rights and that the right
to choose whom one will marry is only the totally dependent second right, the first being the
right to alter the core meaning of marriage by redefinition. Because the opinion begins its
analysis with a redescription (redefinition) of marriage as a close personal relationship of two
adults and then proceeds to demonstrate that no good reason exists for limiting the “two
adults” to a man and a woman, the plurality opinion’s equality-rights argument is “viciously
circular.” Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at
97, 98–101.
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Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here.”126 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Greaney went down the track of the Hawaii plurality
opinion and its use of Loving’s rejection of the equal-application
argument in support of the conclusion that man/woman marriage is
a form of sex discrimination.127
The dissent by Justice Spina argued that the majority had
mistakenly elevated the notion of “choice” as the essential element of
marriage, contrary to what the court had done in Loving.128 Justice
Spina noted:
The “choice” to which the Supreme Court referred was the “choice
to marry,” and it concluded that with respect to the institution of
marriage, the State had no compelling interest in limiting the
choice to marry along racial lines. The Supreme Court did not
imply the existence of a right to marry a person of the same sex.129

In other words, Loving stands for the proposition that racial
classifications are not grounds for denying the right to marry and
does not stand for the proposition that marriage can and should be
defined to suit individual desires. The dissent of Justice Cordy
similarly argued that Loving and other United States Supreme Court
marriage cases recognized marriage as a fundamental right because of
the institution’s importance and because of the institution’s role in
regulating the consequences of heterosexual procreation.130 The
Cordy dissent characterized the majority’s approach to be, first,
redefining marriage and then, second, declaring a right to the new
institution to be fundamental.131
Two recent decisions from the State of Washington also invoked
Loving, albeit in significantly different ways. In the first, a state trial
judge invoked Loving for the proposition that the historical
acceptance of a restriction does not make it constitutional.132 In the
second, a federal bankruptcy court rejected a constitutional challenge
to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act by noting that Loving relied

126. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.
127. Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 984.
132. Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *5
(Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004).
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on a finding of racial discrimination rather than the sex
discrimination allegedly tainting the federal statute.133
Perhaps the most extensive treatment of the antimiscegenation
cases is contained in one of the several marriage cases recently
decided in the New York trial courts.134 That decision opened with
an invocation of the Perez and Loving decisions, which the court
linked to the claim of the same-sex couples who were before the
court as plaintiffs: “[T]he freedom to choose whom to marry has
consistently been the subject of political outcry and controversy.”135
The court also invoked the antimiscegenation decisions to dismiss
concerns about overturning the longstanding definition of marriage
as the union of a man and a woman: “[T]he United States Supreme
Court was not deterred by the deep historical roots of antimiscegenation laws.”136 The court further relied on Loving and Perez
in identifying the right to marry as the right to choose one’s
spouse137 and cited to Perez as an example of a state court refusing to
consider the laws of other states in reaching its decision.138 Finally,
the court invoked Loving while rejecting any deference to the
legislature in the matter.139 In all, the court cited Loving at least
eighteen times and Perez about a half-dozen times—a rather striking
statistic given that the New York decision expressly limited its entire
basis to the state constitution.
Not surprisingly, the one California decision to date on the
definition of marriage focused more on Perez than on Loving.140 In
that opinion, a San Francisco trial court supported its holding that
the California marriage statute constitutes impermissible sex
discrimination by referring to Perez’s rejection of the equalapplication justification for the law.141

133. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
134. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
4, 2005).
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *2. Unlike Loving, the New York trial court ignored, or was simply unaware
of, the even older root stock of marriage into which the white supremacists’ marriage project
grafted the foreign racial branch.
137. Id. at *13.
138. Id. at *16.
139. Id. at *23.
140. See In re Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2005).
141. Id. at *9.
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Those are the cases. As noted at the outset, the Perez/Loving
argument is also ubiquitous in the public debate of the marriage
issue. The argument packs a rhetorical punch. At the rhetorical level,
it effectively (1) implies that support for man/woman marriage (and
therefore, of necessity, opposition to genderless marriage) is morally
akin to racism; (2) creates a sense of inevitability regarding
genderless marriage; (3) consequently implies (especially to legacyconscious officials) that supporting genderless marriage is the only
way to stay on the “right side of history”; and (4) fosters a particular
self-perception in those accepting and implementing the argument—
a self-perception of equivalence with those who fought the great civil
rights battles of earlier generations.142
V. USING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE AS A MEANS,
NOT AN END
A. Evidences of the Use of Marriage To Achieve a Broader
Cultural, Social, and Political Agenda
The suggestion summarized in unvarnished form at the
beginning of this Article is that, for the gay/lesbian rights
movement, the institution of marriage is not really a destination but
rather a powerful tool for the achievement of a broader cultural,
social, and political agenda. Stated slightly differently, the primary
objective of the campaign to redefine marriage is to bring that
institution into service to the movement’s essentially nonmarriage
agenda. That suggestion presupposes a number of things, and the
accuracy of those presuppositions bears on the validity of the
suggestion. We address those presuppositions, even though most are
probably widely taken for granted.
First, there is a gay/lesbian rights movement. That is not to say
that it is monolithic in organization or objectives, or that it responds

142. Professor Douglas Farrow describes the mindset as follows:
The struggle for gay marriage, like the struggle against the anti-miscegenation laws
of America’s southern states, is a noble one that keeps alive the heroic spirit of the
freedom marches. (Is that not what justifies the pictures we saw in the papers of
Halpern judges celebrating their landmark decision over drinks, arm in arm with
activists and former litigants?) The march toward freedom is still moving. The old
are still young, and the only question is where to march next.
Farrow, supra note 31, at 2–3. For more on the Halpern case, see infra note 145 and text
accompanying notes 167 and 171.
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to the directives of a highly centralized command and control
apparatus. It is to say that the movement, with all the variety of its
actors and all the shadings of its objectives and projects (and even
with its schisms), is self-consciously a movement; its actors perceive it
as a social movement of some force and consequence, and in
important ways, they define themselves and formulate their projects
in relation to that perception.143 Thus, it is sensible to speak of the
gay/lesbian rights movement as an actual social phenomenon
possessing both certain acknowledged (tacitly at least) social
objectives as well as necessary social resources to make the
movement’s pursuit of those objectives consequential.144
Next, the objectives of the gay/lesbian rights movement are
rationally and emotionally consistent with the project to redefine
marriage. Stated generally, the ultimate objective is a society
affording wide acceptance of the equal moral validity of gay and
lesbian life experiences and thus affording to gays and lesbians equal
social opportunity and freedom from adverse treatment.145 For a
number of fairly obvious reasons, judicial imposition of genderless
marriage is seen as advancing that objective.
Next, the gay/lesbian rights movement, as a movement, has in
fact pursued the redefinition of marriage and in the process devoted
considerable resources to the task. A prime example is the
thoroughly orchestrated, systematic, and persistent effort of key
components of the movement—such as Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, and
143. See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND
COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000); Even Wolfson, All
Together Now, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 3 (Lynn D. Wardle et al.
eds., 2003); Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying
Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 511 (2003).
144. NeJaime, supra note 143.
145. See, e.g., Halpern v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161, at para. 5 (Ont. 2003) (“This public
recognition and sanction of marital relationships reflect society’s approbation of the personal
hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal relationships. This can
only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth and dignity.”).
NeJaime notes this opening statement of the Human Rights Campaign’s Annual
Report: “As the nation’s largest lesbian and gay political organization, the Human Rights
Campaign envisions an America where lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people are
ensured of their basic equal rights—and can be open, honest and safe at home, at work and in
the community.” NeJaime, supra note 143, at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION,
ANNUAL REPORT: APRIL 1, 2000–MARCH 31, 2001 (2001)).
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the National Center for Lesbian Rights—to raise state constitutional
challenges in judicial systems thought likely to be sympathetic. These
key components build on each success (by proceeding to the next
most likely court), avoid sure and even likely losers, and calibrate the
timing of each step to maximize speed consistent with avoidance of a
too-rapid advance that might bring forth adverse judicial rulings in
jurisdictions that, just a year or two later and with more “evolving
social developments,” might bring forth judicial victories. 146
Those are the points widely taken for granted. We now turn to
an essential link in the logic/evidence chain. It is that, although
most of the leadership and a strong majority of the movement’s
adherents favor the campaign for genderless marriage, relatively few
of those have a manifested intent to marry once they can. More
specifically, the emerging accounts and reports from jurisdictions
where same-sex couples may legally marry reveal two patterns. First,
the strong majority of the gay and lesbian community appear to
desire the redefinition of marriage from the union of a man and a
woman to the union of any two persons and, thus, reject legislative
solutions that grant same-sex couples virtually all the benefits of
marriage except use of the word “marriage.”147 Second, the number
of same-sex couples actually entering marriage when they can do so
legally is relatively small and is marked by a downward trend.148
Regarding the second pattern, the example of the Netherlands—
the first country to move from man/woman marriage to genderless
marriage—is instructive. The infrequent use and downward trend of
marriage can be seen in a press release issued by Statistics
Netherlands—a department of that country’s Ministry of Economic
Affairs.149 The release notes that in 2001, when marriage was
officially redefined to include same-sex couples, there were 2400

146. See David J. Garrow, Toward a More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, § 6,
at 52; see also Duncan, supra note 101, at 645–47.
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the
Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001).
148. David Frum, A Blow to Canada’s Families, NAT’L POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A20
(“[Eighteen] months after same-sex marriage arrived in Canada, some 98% of adult Canadian
gays have chosen to ignore their new legal right.”); Noelle Knox, European Gay-Union Trends
Influence U.S. Debate, USA TODAY, July 14, 2004, at 5A (noting a forty percent decrease in
the number of same-sex couples contracting marriage in the Netherlands since the law became
available).
149. Press Release, Statistics Netherlands, More Marriages and More Partnerships (Nov.
27, 2002), available at www.cbs.nl/en/publications/press-releases/2002/pb02e244.pdf.
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same-sex marriages but this number dropped to 1900 in 2002.150
The release says: “Same-sex couples do not seem to be very
interested in marriage. Statistics Netherlands estimates that there are
about 50 thousand same-sex couples in the Netherlands, of whom
less than 10 percent has married so far.”151 Since the press release was
issued, the downward trend has continued: the number of same-sex
153
marriages dropped to 1500 in 2003152 and 1100 in 2004.
This statistical evidence is consistent with anecdotal evidence
from Canada and the United States. As an editor of a Canadian gay
magazine in Toronto stated, “Ambiguity is a good word for the
feeling among gays about marriage . . . .”154 The journalist reporting
such comments noted that:
[This] ambivalence is reflected in the numbers of gay couples who
have chosen marriage so far. While members of Toronto’s gay
population, by far Canada’s largest, express support of the Ontario
court’s ruling and Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s decision to
introduce legislation to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide, they
have not mobilized to defend the change.155

The article further notes that in the first months after the
decision to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Ontario,
only a few hundred same-sex couples sought marriage licenses at the
Toronto city hall—a small fraction of the 6685 same-sex couples
registered as domestic partners in Toronto.156 More recently, the
same journalist has noted that the rate of same-sex marriages has
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also D. MANTING & J.A. LOEVE, ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNION
DISSOLUTION OF COUPLES IN THE 1990S IN THE NETHERLANDS 4–5 (Mar. 16, 2004),
available at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/maatschappij/bevolking/papers/
economic-circumstances-union-dissolution.pdf; LIESBETH STEENHOF & CAREL HARMSEN,
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE NETHERLANDS 10 (2003), available at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/
publicaties/publicaties/maatschappij/bevolking/papers/same-sex-couples.pdf.
152. VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE COLLECTION OF
DATA TO MEASURE THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION IN A SELECTION OF
COUNTRIES: FINAL REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS 26 (June 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/aneval/pb_en.pdf.
153. See Statistics Netherlands, Population by Month, Quarter, and Year (2004), at
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/Start.asp?lp=Search/Search&LA=EN&DM=SLEN
(last
visited May 11, 2005).
154. Clifford Krauss, Now Free To Marry, Canada’s Gays Say, ‘Do I?,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2003, §1, at 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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been falling since the redefinition of marriage in Canada, despite the
fact that 34,200 same-sex couples registered as permanent partners
in the 2001 census, the large majority of whom have not married.157
Another article quotes a “coordinator of the office for queer issues at
the University of Toronto” as saying: “It’s an accomplishment, the
legalization of same-sex marriage. But I think the desire for it in the
community simply doesn’t match that accomplishment.”158 In
Montreal, another man from the gay/lesbian community is quoted
as saying: “‘It’s important to get the choice, but I don’t really want
to get married. . . . It’s for the igaliti,’ he said—equality, ‘Just feeling
as the others.’”159
A media report from Provincetown, Massachusetts, focusing on a
same-sex couple who had lived together for 15 years notes:
[The couple] believe[s] that gays should have the right to marry,
both as a matter of simple equality and as a form of legal
protection.
But that doesn’t mean they necessarily want to exercise that
right. “Do we need the marriage ceremony or all of the inherent
baggage that goes with it?”160

Other accounts from the American gay and lesbian community
also reflect this sharp distinction between capturing the right to
marry and actually exercising it, with the first endeavor having
widespread support while the second languishes.
In sum, the evidence is of a large disparity between the gay and
lesbian community’s support for the right of same-sex couples to
marry, on the one hand, and actual exercise of that right, on the
other hand. We see this evidence as probative of the suggestion
summarized at the beginning of this Article: For the gay/lesbian
rights movement qua movement, the institution of marriage is not

157. Clifford Krauss, The Right To Marry, or Not To Marry, Is the Issue Among Canada’s
Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 4, at 14 (“Only an estimated 4,500 couples . . . have tied
the knot in Canada since the first [court] decision . . . opened the door.”).
158. Matthew Hays, Dodging the Altar: Gay Men and Lesbians Aren’t Exactly Rushing To
ADVOCATE,
May
11,
2004,
available
at
Marry
in
Canada,
THE
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1589/is_2004_May_11/ai_n6152730.
159. Anne C. Mulkern, Canada Offers Preview of Gay-Marriage Impacts, DENVER POST,
July 4, 2004, at A1.
160. Don Aucoin, For Gays, No Unanimity on Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2003,
at A1.
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really a destination but rather a powerful tool for the achievement of
a broader cultural, social, and political agenda. Stated slightly
differently, the primary objective of the campaign to redefine
marriage is to bring that institution into service for the movement’s
essentially nonmarriage agenda. We know of no other plausible
account of the evidence.
B. The “Atypical Couples Tactic”
We also perceive an effort to mask or obscure what has been
going on with the new project to appropriate marriage. The
gay/lesbian rights movement has skillfully and often successfully
deployed what may fairly be called the “atypical couples tactic.” This
tactic uses as the public face of the genderless marriage campaign a
number of carefully selected same-sex couples virtually
indistinguishable (except for gender) from Ozzie and Harriet Nelson
or Clair and Heathcliff Huxtable and then points relentlessly to those
couples as the “answer” to what the genderless marriage campaign is
all about.161 The phrase “atypical couples tactic” is fair because such
couples constitute a quite small portion of the gay and lesbian
community162 and because the movement, and especially its most
active litigating components—Lambda Legal Defense and Education
164
Fund163 and Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) —
is indeed being consciously tactical:

161. See, e.g., LAMBDA LEGAL, NEW JERSEY: FAMILY PROFILES, at http://www.lambda
legal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/133.pdf (last visited May 10, 2005).
162. We have no desire to enter into the highly contentious subject of gay/lesbian
demographics; our review of the literature, however, supports the essential accuracy of this
conclusion by Dr. Timothy J. Dailey: “[O]nly a small minority of gays and lesbians choose to
live in partnered relationships, and furthermore, only a small percentage of partnered
homosexual households actually have children.” Timothy J. Dailey, Comparing the Lifestyles of
Homosexual Couples to Married Couples, INSIGHT (March 24, 2004), available at
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS04C02.
163. Lambda is based in New York City and pursues “impact litigation,” an example
being the test case in New Jersey, Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114
(N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). For more information about Lambda’s litigation efforts,
including its activity with regards to the appeal of Lewis, see http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/cases/summary.html (last visited May 10, 2005).
164. GLAD is based in Boston and successfully prosecuted the same-sex marriage cases in
Vermont, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), and Massachusetts, Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For more information about GLAD’s litigation
efforts, see http://www.glad.org (last visited May 10, 2005).
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At times, lawyers must construct identities in order to achieve legal
reform. For instance, if the judiciary proves sympathetic to a
particular gay identity—e.g., homosexual as respectable family
member—advocates will use such identity to obtain desirable
results . . . .
....
Much like Lambda, GLAD relies on . . . normalizing rhetoric and
. . . goes to great lengths to discuss the plaintiff couples and
describe their lives in hetero-normative terms. While the couples
are technically GLAD’s clients, they are held up as signifiers for the
broader constituency seeking marriage rights. They are meant to be
representative, both in the sense of being ideal within society and
ordinary within GLBT circles. . . . [T]he plaintiff couples are meant
to typify most other gay couples . . . .165

Here are examples of the successful use of that tactic. In cases
mandating genderless marriage in British Columbia,166 Ontario,167
and Massachusetts,168 advocates of man/woman marriage sought to
argue that alteration in the core and constitutive meaning of the
marriage institution would greatly alter the institution and its role in
society and thereby jeopardize the institution’s social goods. In the
two contexts where this argument was relevant, the courts elided it.
In the first context, the likelihood of institutional change, the
Goodridge plurality opinion in Massachusetts presented as proof of
“no change” the intentions of the same-sex couples then before the
court: “Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to
undermine the institution of civil marriage,”169 and “[t]hat same-sex
couples are willing to [enter civil marriage] . . . is a testament to the
enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.”170
In Ontario, Halpern took the same tack: “The Couples are not
seeking to abolish the institution of marriage; they are seeking access
to it.”171 (But, as we have noted elsewhere, “the probative value of
165. NeJaime, supra note 143, at 519, 545 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is
worth noting that the referenced constituency seeks marriage rights, not marriage.
166. EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1 (B.C. 2003).
167. Halpern v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161 (Ont. 2003).
168. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
169. Id. at 965.
170. Id.
171. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161, at para. 129.
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such intentions and willingness is not at all apparent; it seems
nonsensical that the intentions of a handful of people could insulate
a vast social institution constituted by its public meanings from
change resulting from a profound alteration in those meanings.”172)
In the second context, the strength of the societal interests in
preserving man/woman marriage, the courts again turned away from
the social institutional realities to the feelings of the couples.
[A] central feature of the language from the[se] . . . cases . . . is its
shift to the personal perspective—“the personal hopes, desires and
aspirations,” “the professed commitment of two individuals,” and
the “deeply personal commitment of the marriage partners to one
another”. The societal interest and role in all this couplecenteredness is only “public celebration” of it, that is, society is an
important guest at the wedding. But a wedding is not a marriage. A
marriage seems better understood as participation in and
engagement with a rich, complex, influential social institution
whose meanings and deep logic seem best accounted for primarily
by reference to societal interests, not individual hopes and
desires.173

This shift to “the personal perspective” qualifies as a “successful”
deployment of the atypical couples tactic because, “when speaking of
civil marriage, the shift in judicial focus to the wedding and to other
manifestations of the personal perspective and away from society’s
interests embedded in and served by the institution of marriage of
necessity diminishes the force of those societal interests in the equality
analysis.”174
VI. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS
We believe that the work of the prior sections rather strongly
validates this conclusion: The means successfully employed by the
white supremacist movement to advance its essentially nonmarriage

172. Stewart, supra note 5, at 79.
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 62. It seems fair to say that there is a contest within the larger contest and that
it is a contest between a “macro” perspective and a “micro” perspective. The former
comprehends the social institutional realities summarized supra Part II, while the latter is
highly atomistic, with its personal rights rhetoric. Across the arenas where the larger contest is
waged, we have observed that genderless marriage advocates, as a general rule, decline to
engage the macro perspective and, when it is thrust before them, quickly revert to the
arguments and rhetoric of the micro perspective.
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agenda—altering the core meaning of marriage—is of a kind with
the means being employed by the gay/lesbian rights movement to
advance its essentially nonmarriage agenda. Now, it does not
necessarily follow, in abstract logic, that the means, because of a
kind, are unjustified in both cases.175 Some advocates of redefinition
may well argue that the contemporary movement’s objectives are
laudable and justify the means, while the discredited objectives of the
older movement did not; in other words, that the ends here and now
justify the means, whereas the ends then and there did not. But what
is called for, it seems to us, is that this “the ends justify the means”
argument engage, not elide, two realities: one, redefinition as indeed
a means to implement a broader and nonmarriage agenda and, two,
redefinition as a profoundly consequential alteration—indeed, a
dismantling—of the vital social institution of man/woman
marriage.176 The second may be seen as the “price tag” hanging on
the first.
Our reflections on that price tag run as follows: Our society can
sustain one and only one marriage institution. Society cannot, at the
same time, tell the people (and especially the children) that marriage
is the union of any two persons and that marriage is the union of a
man and a woman. Two “coexisting” social institutions known
society-wide as marriage is a factual impossibility. Thus, success of
the gay/lesbian rights movement’s marriage project will in the
process of time necessarily displace the institution of man/woman
marriage and necessarily deprive society of the social goods provided,
sometimes uniquely, by the old institution.177 So, although one may
175. We have no intent to do to genderless marriage advocates what their use of the
Perez/Loving argument has done to their opponents—implied that their position is morally
akin to racism.
176. The scholarship of Katherine K. Young and Paul Nathanson accounts, in our
judgment, for the contemporary marriage project’s much greater destructive effect on the
marriage institution, compared to the effect of the older white supremacist marriage project.
Young and Nathanson, based on “[c]omparative research on the worldviews of both smallscale societies and those of world religions,” conclude: “Marriage has universal, nearly
universal, and variable features.” Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an
Experiment, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 45. The redefinition of marriage
implemented by the white supremacists affected only a variable feature: “endogamy (marrying
within a group) or exogamy (marrying outside it).” Id. By contrast, the redefinition from the
union of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons counters a number of the
universal and nearly universal features of marriage. Id.
177. What we are saying contrasts starkly with the old “definitional preclusion,” “natural
limits,” and “marriage as supra-legal construct” arguments. Each of those, in its own way, says
in effect that something essential to marriage precludes alteration by the law and, hence, by
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by selective reference to social institutional realities tout genderless
marriage as the way to a more just and equal society, the full panoply
of relevant institutional realities compels acknowledgement of the
awesome price that must be paid for entry into such a radically new
and different world.
How large the price is suggested by a listing of what must of
necessity be lost with the deinstitutionalization of man/woman
marriage:
First, husbands and wives. Man/woman marriage is the only
institution that can confer the status of husband and wife, that can
transform a male into a husband (a social identity quite different
from “partner”),178 and thus that can transform males into
husband/fathers (a category of males particularly beneficial to
society).179
Second, an effective bridge over the male-female divide.
“[M]arriage has always been the central cultural site of male-female
relations”180 and society’s primary and most effective means of
bridging the male-female divide—that “massive cultural effort of
every human society at all times and in all places.”181
Third, the most effective means humankind has developed so far
to maximize the level of private welfare provided to the children
conceived by passionate, heterosexual coupling.182 The phrase private
welfare includes not just the provision of physical needs such as food,
clothing, and shelter; it encompasses opportunities such as
education, play, work, and discipline and intangibles such as love,
respect, and security.
Fourth, the effective means to make real the child’s right to
know and to be brought up by his or her biological parents (with
society. We are saying plainly that the law and, hence, a society do indeed have the power to
alter the constitutive meaning of marriage in that society; the real issue is the wisdom of doing
so. We need to say at the same time that, as a matter of social institutional reality, same-sex
couples cannot enter the marriage institution that has come down to us; their law-mandated
marriage constitutes entry into a different institution, one defined at its core as the union of
any two persons and one embodying the close personal relationship model of marriage.
Stewart, supra note 5, at 84 (“Same-sex couples look to the law to let them into the privileged
institution, and the law . . . may want to, but it cannot; it can only give them access to a
different institution of different value.”).
178. See, e.g., DeCoste, supra note 27, at 625–26.
179. See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 29, at 139–88.
180. Cere, supra note 6, at 14.
181. Young & Nathanson, supra note 28, at 43.
182. Stewart, supra note 5, at 44–52.
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exceptions being justified only in the best interests of the child, not
those of any adult).
[A]ccepting same-sex marriage necessarily means accepting that the
societal institution of marriage is intended primarily for the benefit
of the partners to the marriage, and only secondarily for the
children born into it. And it means abolishing the norm that
children—whatever their sexual orientation later proves to be—
have a prima facie right to know and be reared within their own
biological family by their mother and father. Carefully restricted,
governed, and justified exceptions to this norm, such as adoption,
are essential. But abolishing the norm would have a far-reaching
impact.183

Fifth, authoritative encouragement of the child-rearing mode—
that is, married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways
not subject to reasonable dispute)184 with the optimal outcomes
deemed crucial for a child’s (and hence society’s) well being. These
outcomes include physical, mental, and emotional health and
development; academic performance and levels of attainment; and
avoidance of crime and other forms of self- and other-destructive
behavior such as drug abuse and high-risk sexual conduct.185

183. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra
note 6, at 67.
184. As Justice Sosman said in her dissenting opinion in Goodridge:
[S]tudies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences between
children raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples.
Interpretation of the data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the
personal and political beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the differences
identified are positive or negative, and as to the untested explanations of what might
account for those differences. (This is hardly the first time in history that the
ostensible steel of the scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense
heat of political and religious passions.) . . . [T]he most neutral and strict application
of scientific principles to this field would be constrained by the limited period of
observation that has been available. . . . The Legislature can rationally view the state
of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the critical question it now faces: are
families headed by same-sex parents equally successful in rearing children from
infancy to adulthood as families headed by parents of opposite sexes?
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979–80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
185. Stewart, supra note 5, at 64–70.
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Sixth, the power to officially endorse that form of adult
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may
rationally value above all other such forms.186
The arguments marshaled to discount this price tag or even to
deny its existence strike us as fundamentally inadequate. The first
and most often deployed argument simply ignores the social
institutional realities of marriage: “Redefinition will not really change
anything. Just as many straight men and women will marry—and
have just as many children—if gays can marry or not.”187 But this
mantra entirely misses the point. The point is what the straight men
and women will be marrying “into.” They will be marrying into a
much different social institution than their parents married into
simply because, undeniably, a constitutive core meaning will be
radically different. And that means that they (and the generations
after them) will undergo a much different formative and
transformative experience.
The inadequacy of this “no downside” argument does not end
there. Social institutions are renewed and strengthened by use
consistent with the shared public meanings constituting them.
“[E]ach use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that
institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use
renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage . . . .”188 After
redefinition, every use of the new institution by a man/woman
couple will validate and reinforce it; after all, that couple will be
invoking on their union the sanctioning power of a polity that
rigorously views their union as one between “two persons.” Because
those “two persons” happen to be a man and a woman, the

186. Id. at 54–57. Because the redefinition occurs by judicial mandate, assertedly
compelled by constitutional norms—this being the context in which the Perez/Loving
argument is deployed—any official or “state action” acknowledgement of marriage as the
union of a man and a woman is Constitution-taboo.
187. Another “argument” may actually be moving into first position among genderless
marriage advocates. It is simply to proceed from the assumed or implied premise that of course
man/woman marriage violates equality norms and constitutes discrimination. In other words,
the speaker proceeds as if she “owns” the words equality and discrimination. From this
beginning, it is not difficult to move to the conclusion that man/woman marriage violates
equality norms and constitutes discrimination. But it goes without saying (or rather, should go
without saying) that what the contest is all about is the meaning of equality and discrimination
in the context of marriage, particularly its social institutional realities. The increasingly popular
new “argument,” being wholly circular, hinders rather than helps in reaching an understanding
of the rational use of those two words in the marriage context.
188. SEARLE, supra note 11, at 57.
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consequences may initially be misunderstood by many or even most,
but the strengthening effect on the new institution is largely
unavoidable.189 Thus the argument—“just as many straight men and
women will marry”— actually cuts against, not in favor of,
genderless marriage once willful blindness toward the social
institutional realities is no longer tolerated.
The other main argument advanced to discount or to evaporate
the cost of this price tag is the following: “The law won’t really have
that big of an impact on a fundamental social institution. People
know what they think; it doesn’t matter what the law says is right.
Something like marriage will just go on as before.” This appeal to
the impotency of the law, of course, ignores the historical truth that
when in America the law starts a current running through society—
and does so in the name of the Constitution—that current will
broaden and deepen and become ever swifter until it has transformed
the landscape. The ending of de jure segregation in the South after
Brown v. Board of Education190 amounted to “revolutionary racial
change,”191 and other than the end of apartheid in South Africa, it is
difficult to identify in history a social transformation of equal
magnitude effected without war. There is something almost
astounding in the irony of the “impotent law” argument being used
in the same context with the Perez/Loving argument.
To understand the “impotent law” argument’s kinship with the
“enclave” argument is to further understand the inadequacy of both
arguments. The “enclave” argument is that those in our society who
do not agree with the teachings and formative influences of the
genderless marriage institution and the interests that institution
advances can simply enter an enclave—linguistic, social, and/or
religious—where they can do their own marriage thing unaffected by
the new social institution. But as we have noted elsewhere,192 there

189. We say “largely” because a man and a woman desiring to avoid complicity with the
new institutional regime could fulfill that desire—but only by openly participating in a
decidedly exclusive marriage ceremony sanctioned only by a decidedly exclusive norm
community (in other words, by openly foregoing civilly sanctioned genderless marriage by
means of a consciously political act). The price for doing so includes forfeiting the benefits of
civil marriage and being officially labeled as bigoted (or at least “discriminatory”)—that is, as
hostile to the constitutional ideal of equality.
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7, 11 (1994).
192. Stewart, supra note 5, at 82–83.
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are problems with the notion that resourceful people could still find
ways to communicate to the next generations of children the unique
goods of man/woman marriage and its value. Certainly some might;
by private educational endeavor it is possible for families or other
groups to establish a sort of linguistic enclave in the heart of a
community that has no comprehension of what matters to them. But
to the degree that members of the enclave were to adopt the speech
of the community, they would lose the power to name and, in large
part, the power to discern what once mattered to their forbears. To
that degree, their forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them,
and probably even unintelligible. The bare possibility that people
could, with considerable difficulty and sacrifice, maintain the
meanings for their children of man/woman marriage is therefore just
that—a bare possibility.
The possibility becomes even less substantial upon realization
that
[t]o change the core meaning of marriage from the union of a man
and a woman . . . to the union of any two persons [will result in]
. . . the new meaning [being] mandated in texts, in schools, and in
many other parts of the public square and voluntarily published by
the media and other institutions, with society, especially its
children, thereby losing the ability to discern the meanings of the
old institution.193

Only an excessively sanguine artist would paint this postredefinition picture: the State of (fill in the blank: Massachusetts,
California, etc.) as the happy home of many different marriage norm
communities, each doing its own marriage thing, each equally valid
before the law, each equally secure in its own space. There is reason
to believe that the genuinely realistic picture as a matter of legal and
social fact is far different: The state mandates by force of polity-wide
law one and only one marriage institution and one and only one

193. Id. at 111. Helen Reece’s observation merits repetition here:
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who
are dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial
norm community. But this is not a complete solution because the social
construction of choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem
unthinkable or may be too costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it
may also be merely reactive to or even defined by the dominant norm community.
REECE, supra note 15, at 38.
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marriage norm, and that is genderless marriage. That norm will be
mandated in and reinforced by texts, mandated in and reinforced by
schools, and mandated in and reinforced by many other parts of the
public square and, furthermore, will be voluntarily published by the
media and other institutions. One marriage norm community will be
officially sanctioned and protected; all other marriage norm
communities will be officially constrained, will be officially
disdained.194 To say otherwise is to say that the law, as an institution
itself, would not be subject to strong institutional mandates—some
sounding in logic and consistency, some in more elementary
considerations—to be persistent and thoroughgoing in enforcing its
newly declared “constitutional” norm. In the same vein, to say
otherwise is to say that the law is impotent to reinforce, to alter, or
to dismantle social institutions, and no rational, informed person says
that. No, the law is tremendously potent in this area, and the
unavoidable price of using the law to enthrone the genderless
marriage institution is the dismantling and loss (if not immediately,
then certainly sooner rather than later) of the marriage institution
heretofore central in our society.

194. Farrow, supra note 125, at 101–02 (“The preamble to this draft legislation [the
Chrétien government’s proposed genderless marriage bill of 2003] indicates that redefining
marriage to make it accessible to same-sex couples will ‘reflect values of tolerance, respect and
equality’ consistent with the Charter. But of course it follows that those who oppose
redefinition do not reflect such values. This charge, publicly made and enshrined in law, can
only diminish the respect in which such people are held . . . .”); Darrel Reid & Janet Epp
Buckingham, Whose Rights? Whose Freedoms?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 84
(“The fact is that millions of Canadians who are opposed to same-sex marriage have now been
told by the courts that their view on marriage is contrary to the Charter and, by extension, unCanadian.”).
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